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FOREIGN OFFICIAL IMMUNITY
AND THE “BASELINE” PROBLEM
Chimène I. Keitner*
INTRODUCTION
The parable is sometimes told of a person who, having asked for
directions, receives the response: “I wouldn’t start from here.” Although
there can be more than one path to the same destination, starting points do
matter. At times, starting points can even determine outcomes. This is true
of foreign official immunity, as recent judicial opinions and academic
commentary illustrate.
By “foreign official immunity,” I mean the immunity of current or
former officials of one state from the adjudicatory jurisdiction of another
state. Such immunity could exist under the forum state’s domestic law,
under international law, or both. In thinking about jurisdictional immunity,
it is helpful to distinguish between status-based immunity, which attaches to
an individual while he or she occupies a particular position, and conductbased immunity, which attaches to certain acts performed by individuals on
behalf of states. 1
Conduct-based immunity has emerged as a more contested category than
status-based immunity, particularly in cases that are not explicitly governed
by statute or treaty. In several recent cases, domestic courts have grappled
with the scope of conduct-based immunity as a matter of common law,
statutory law, and customary international law. In so doing, some courts
have failed to distinguish between precedents involving defendants who are
physically present in the forum state’s territory, and precedents involving
defendants who have not been served within the jurisdiction. Insisting on
this distinction might at first seem counterintuitive, because conduct-based
immunity attaches to the act, not the individual. However, all cases of
* Associate Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. The
author represented amici Professors of Public International Law and Comparative Law in
Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010).
1. I have elaborated on this point elsewhere. See Chimène I. Keitner, Annotated Brief of
Professors of Public International Law and Comparative Law as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 609, 621–22 (2011) [hereinafter Keitner, Annotated
Brief] (amicus brief for Samantar); Chimène I. Keitner, The Common Law of Foreign
Official Immunity, 14 GREEN BAG 2D 61, 63–67 (2010) [hereinafter Keitner, The Common
Law]; Chimène I. Keitner, Foreign Official Immunity After Samantar, 44 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. (forthcoming 2011) [hereinafter Keitner, Foreign Official Immunity];
Chimène I. Keitner, Officially Immune? A Response to Bradley and Goldsmith, 36 YALE J.
INT’L L. ONLINE 1, 8–9 (2010), http://www.yjil.org/docs/pub/o-36-keitner-officiallyimmune.pdf.
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immunity involve competing jurisdictional principles. When a defendant is
not physically present within the forum state, there is no competing
principle of territorial jurisdiction (unless the conduct occurred in the forum
state, in which case most states recognize an exception to state immunity
for tortious conduct that results in personal injury, death, or property
damage or loss). When a defendant is physically present within the forum
state, a competing principle of plenary jurisdiction over territory must be
taken into account. In these cases, conduct-based immunity might not
preclude the exercise of adjudicatory jurisdiction, leaving it to other
doctrines (such as the political question doctrine or the act of state doctrine)
to curb the exercise of adjudicatory jurisdiction where appropriate.
This overlooked distinction might be called the “baseline” problem.
Some judges and scholars begin with the assumption that all conduct
performed on behalf of a foreign state is entitled to conduct-based
immunity. This could be called the attribution theory of immunity, since it
insists on symmetry between actions that are attributable to the state and
those that benefit from the state’s immunity. Starting from a baseline of
immunity, those who subscribe to an attribution theory then search for an
exception to immunity, either based on the consent of the official’s home
state (waiver), or in an international treaty or custom. 2 Although I have
argued elsewhere that the precedents invoked to support the attribution
theory actually do not stand for the proposition that all acts performed on
behalf of a state are entitled to immunity, 3 that is not my focus here.
A second approach, which might be called the territorial theory, begins
with a presumption in favor of the territorial jurisdiction of the forum state.4
This is the accepted approach where the conduct occurs on the forum state’s
territory. It also makes sense when a current or former foreign official who
is not entitled to status-based immunity (including immunity for
participation in a special diplomatic mission) enters the forum state’s
2. See, e.g., Special Rapporteur on the Immunity of State Officials from Foreign
Criminal Jurisdiction, Second Rep. on Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal
Jurisdiction, Int’l Law Comm’n, ¶ 24, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/631 (June 10, 2010) (by Roman
Anatolevich Kolodkin) (“The Special Rapporteur considers it right to use the criterion of the
attribution to the State of the conduct of an official in order to determine whether the official
has immunity ratione materiae and the scope of such immunity.”); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack
L. Goldsmith, Foreign Sovereign Immunity, Individual Officials, and Human Rights
Litigation, 13 GREEN BAG 2D 9, 13 (2009) (“Since a state acts through individuals, a suit
against an individual official for actions carried out on behalf of the state is in reality a suit
against the foreign state, even if that is not how the plaintiff captions his or her complaint.”).
3. See Keitner, Annotated Brief, supra note 1, at 616–18, 623–27; see also Jane Wright,
Retribution but No Recompense: A Critique of the Torturer’s Immunity from Civil Suit, 30
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 143, 174–75 (2010).
4. See, e.g., Lee M. Caplan, State Immunity, Human Rights, and Jus Cogens: A
Critique of the Normative Hierarchy Theory, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 741, 744 (2003) (“[A]s a
fundamental matter, state immunity operates as an exception to the principle of adjudicatory
jurisdiction.”); R. Higgins, Certain Unresolved Aspects of the Law of State Immunity, 29
NETH. INT’L L. REV. 265, 271 (1982) (“It is sovereign immunity which is the exception to
jurisdiction and not jurisdiction which is the exception to a basic rule of immunity.”); Lorna
McGregor, Torture and State Immunity: Deflecting Impunity, Distorting Sovereignty, 18
EUR. J. INT’L L. 903, 912 (2007) (characterizing immunity as “an exception to the
jurisdiction of the forum state”).
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territory, or when an official who was previously excluded from the forum
state’s territory as a persona non grata subsequently re-enters the territory.
In such cases, judges should weigh whether or not the exercise of
adjudicatory jurisdiction would be reasonable in the circumstances, starting
with a presumption in favor of plenary jurisdiction.
Courts and commentators generally agree that some actions performed by
individuals on behalf of a state can entail both personal and state
responsibility. 5 There also appears to be an emerging consensus that
national courts can exercise criminal jurisdiction over individuals for
certain internationally unlawful conduct performed on behalf of a foreign
state. 6 However, agreement on the role of national courts in holding
individuals civilly liable has proved more elusive, particularly in
jurisdictions that differentiate sharply between civil and criminal
proceedings. 7
Adherents of the attribution theory regard a suit against an individual as a
suit against the state. They would therefore import the principle of foreign
state immunity wholesale into civil actions against individuals, with or
without a domestic statutory basis for doing so. In their view, unless there
is a treaty or established norm of customary international law denying
immunity from civil suit to individual officials, such suits impermissibly
violate foreign state immunity absent an explicit waiver by the foreign state.
By contrast, adherents of the territorial theory and others take the view that
international law does not require granting civil immunity where the
requested relief would not run directly against the foreign state itself.
The question thus becomes whether a domestic court must search for an
exception to immunity, or an exception to jurisdiction. An analysis of
recent cases shows that courts are not always clear about which of these
inquiries they are conducting. This brief symposium contribution suggests
5. See Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,
with Commentaries, art. 7, in Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 53d sess, at 43, U.N. Doc.
A/56/10; U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001) [hereinafter Draft Articles]. The
attribution of an individual’s actions to the state for the purposes of state responsibility is
“without prejudice to any question of the individual responsibility under international law of
any person acting on behalf of a State.” Id. art. 58; see, e.g., Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No.
IT-95-14-PT, Judgment, ¶ 41 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 29, 1997),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/blaskic/acdec/en/71029JT3.html (“[T]hose responsible for
[conduct within the tribunal’s jurisdiction] cannot invoke immunity from national or
international jurisdiction even if they perpetrated such crimes while acting in their official
capacity.”).
6. See Curtis A. Bradley & Laurence R. Helfer, International Law and the U.S.
Common Law of Foreign Official Immunity, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 213, 238; Dapo Akande &
Sangeeta Shah, Immunities of State Officials, International Crimes, and Foreign Domestic
Courts, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 815, 839–40 (2010).
7. For a discussion of the relationship between civil and criminal immunity, see, for
example, Keitner, Foreign Official Immunity, supra note 1; Beth Stephens, The Modern
Common Law of Foreign Official Immunity, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2669, 2697 (2011);
Wright, supra note 3, at 144–45. For a discussion of the relationship between universal
criminal jurisdiction and universal civil jurisdiction, see generally Donald Francis Donovan
& Anthea Roberts, The Emerging Recognition of Universal Civil Jurisdiction, 100 AM. J.
INT’L L. 142 (2006).
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that searching for an exception to immunity might not, in fact, be the
appropriate starting point, particularly when the defendant is present on the
forum state’s territory. The answer in such cases might well be “I wouldn’t
start from here.”
I. THE UNITED KINGDOM
In 2006, the United Kingdom House of Lords confronted the question of
whether the U.K. State Immunity Act 8 (U.K. SIA) permits a civil action
against foreign officials who were not physically present in the United
Kingdom for torture that took place in Saudi Arabia.9 This question had
not previously been addressed squarely by the lower courts in other cases,
at least one of which had assumed that individual foreign officials were not
immune from service of process outside the United Kingdom. 10
In 2003, a trial court invoked the U.K. SIA to deny Ronald Jones
permission to serve a Saudi Arabian official outside of the United Kingdom
with proceedings by an alternative method in a suit for torture and other
unlawful acts. 11 Mr. Jones appealed, arguing that Part 1 of the U.K. SIA
was incompatible with his right of access to a court under Article 6(1) of
the European Convention on Human Rights. 12 The issue on appeal was not
whether the Saudi official enjoyed immunity under the U.K. SIA, but rather
whether the United Kingdom’s obligations under the European Convention
foreclosed it from providing such immunity in a domestic statute. The
Court of Appeal considered both the U.K. SIA and the effect of Article 6 of
the European Convention to find that individual foreign officials are not
entitled to conduct-based immunity for torture. 13 The House of Lords
reversed. 14
The Court of Appeal grounded its reasoning in the seriousness of the
alleged conduct. Lord Justice Mance wrote a lengthy opinion, in which
both Lord Neuberger and Lord Phillips concurred. Lord Phillips also wrote
separately to indicate his revised understanding of the relationship between
civil and criminal immunity since his participation in the House of Lords’s
decision in Ex parte Pinochet (No. 3). 15
8. 1978, c. 33 (U.K.).
9. See Jones v. Ministry of the Interior of Saudi Arabia, [2006] UKHL 26, [2] (appeal
taken from Eng.).
10. See Al-Adsani v. Government of Kuwait, 100 I.L.R. 465, 466 (Ct. App. 1994) (Eng.)
(referencing but not reviewing the High Court’s conclusion that the three individual
defendants were not immune from service of process outside the jurisdiction).
11. Jones, [2006] UKHL [2] (Lord Bingham of Cornhill).
12. Id. The appeal was consolidated with a similar appeal by Alexander Mitchell,
William Sampson, and Leslie Walker, who were also denied leave to serve Saudi Arabian
officials outside the United Kingdom. Id.
13. Jones v. Ministry of the Interior of Saudi Arabia, [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1394, [96],
[2005] Q.B. 699 (Eng.).
14. Jones, [2006] UKHL [35].
15. [2000] 1 A.C. 147 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.); see Jones, [2004] EWCA (Civ)
[128] (Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers) (citing Pinochet No. 3, [2000] 1 A.C. at 281).
Lord Phillips is currently the President of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, see
Biographies
of
the
Justices,
THE
SUPREME
COURT,
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Lord Justice Mance began by observing that
[t]here are important distinctions between the considerations governing
(a) a claim to immunity by a state in respect of itself and its serving head
of state and diplomats and (b) a state’s claim for immunity in respect of
its ordinary officials or agents generally (including former heads of state
and former diplomats). 16

Permission for the claimant to serve outside the jurisdiction would
ordinarily be available because the alleged torts involved damage
(psychological harm) suffered within the jurisdiction.17 The question, then,
was whether Saudi Arabia’s state immunity posed a barrier to the
jurisdiction of the English courts over the Saudi officials.
Lord Justice Mance recognized that the pre-1978 common law governing
the immunity “in respect of state officials or agents” was embedded “in the
context of the general prohibition against impleading a foreign sovereign
state.” 18 The claimants in Jones relied heavily on the argument that
“systematic torture by a state official (or other person acting in a public
capacity) cannot be regarded as a function of such an official or person,”
even if such action would engage state responsibility. 19 In response, Saudi
Arabia claimed that, “since the state is clearly responsible for torture,
committed by any of its officials in an official context, any suit against such
an official indirectly impleads The Kingdom.” 20 Lord Justice Mance
observed that, under Saudi Arabia’s reasoning, “criminal proceedings
against an alleged torturer may [also] be said indirectly to implead the
foreign state,” 21 yet this result was permitted by the House of Lords in
Pinochet (No. 3). 22 Moreover, a civil suit against an individual would not
involve executing a judgment against state property. Lord Justice Mance
continued:
There would be no incongruity in allowing execution against the
individual assets of an individual torturer, if these could be located and
made the subject of execution. And any claim to hold the state itself
responsible would have to be brought in that state, or in an international
forum, and proved quite separately from any claim against the individual
officer. 23

http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/about/biographies.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2011), which
replaced the House of Lords in October 2009, see The Supreme Court, THE SUPREME COURT,
http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/about/the-supreme-court.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2011).
16. Jones, [2004] EWCA (Civ) [23] (Mance L.J.).
17. Id. [29].
18. Id. [36]. Lord Justice Mance’s opinion discusses many of these cases, as well as
more recent U.S. cases, in great detail. See id. [31]–[43] (common law cases); id. [61]–[68]
(more recent U.S. cases). On the earlier common law cases, see also Keitner, Annotated
Brief, supra note 1, at 623–26.
19. Jones, [2004] EWCA (Civ) [69] (Mance L.J.).
20. Id. [72].
21. Id. [75].
22. Ex parte Pinochet (No. 3), [2000] 1 A.C. 147 (H.L.), at 203–05.
23. Jones, [2004] EWCA (Civ) [77].
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There would, however, be an incongruity in allowing criminal jurisdiction
while precluding civil jurisdiction for the same claims. 24
In sum, Lord Justice Mance concluded, and his colleagues agreed, that an
absolute jurisdictional bar was inappropriate and had no basis in governing
law. Rather, he favored a flexible approach:
Quite apart from any separate principle of state immunity, the fact that a
civil claim was being brought against an official or agent of a foreign state
in respect of conduct in that state, and the sensitivity of any adjudication
by the courts of another state upon such an issue, would rightly feature as
important factors in any decision whether or not to exercise any such
jurisdiction. 25

Lord Phillips wrote separately to underline his agreement that “[i]f civil
proceedings are brought against individuals for acts of torture in
circumstances where the state is immune from suit ratione personae, there
can be no suggestion that the state is vicariously liable.” 26 In such a case,
“[i]t is the personal responsibility of the individuals, not that of the state,
which is in issue. The state is not indirectly impleaded by the
proceedings.” 27 Although this would also be true of civil actions for
conduct not amounting to torture, the Court of Appeal found that torture
was distinguishable at least in part because “no state could be required to
provide an indemnity” 28 for such a serious violation of international law.
One might argue, alternatively, that the seriousness of the alleged conduct
should go to the reasonableness of exercising jurisdiction, rather than the
existence or lack of immunity.
The House of Lords disagreed with the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that
it is “impossible to identify any settled international principle affording the
state the right to claim immunity in respect of claims directed against such
an official, rather than against the state itself or its head or diplomats.” 29 I
have argued elsewhere that the House of Lords’s opinion rests on a
misreading of precedent, in contrast to the more faithful reading by the
Court of Appeal. 30 Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to trace the steps of the
24. Id. [79].
25. Id. [81].
26. Id. [128] (Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers).
27. Id.
28. Id. [35] (Mance L.J.); see also id. [76]. This distinction arose in the court’s
discussion of the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in Jaffe v. Miller (1993) 64 O.A.C. 20
(Can. Ont. C.A.), a case that emphasized the role of indemnification in finding that the
Florida Attorney General and other Florida officials, who had filed criminal charges that led
to the plaintiff’s conviction in Florida, were immune from service of process outside the
jurisdiction. Id. at 31, 33. By contrast, the Irish Supreme Court has held that the possibility
that a foreign government might indemnify the official does not turn the suit into one against
the foreign government: “Where the Sovereign is not named as a party and where there is no
claim against him for damages or otherwise, and where no relief is sought against his person
or his property, [the Sovereign cannot] be said to be impleaded either directly or indirectly.”
Saorstat & Cont’l S.S. Co. v. de las Morenas, [1945] I.R. 291, reprinted in 12 I.L.R. 97, 101
(Ir.).
29. Jones, [2004] EWCA (Civ) [83] (Mance L.J.).
30. See Keitner, Annotated Brief, supra note 1, at 623–28.
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House of Lords’s reasoning, which represents the most sustained (although
flawed) engagement by a state’s highest court with the question of an
individual’s conduct-based immunity from civil suit.
The House of Lords’s opinion begins with Section 1(1) of the U.K. SIA,
which provides that “[a] State is immune from the jurisdiction of the courts
of the United Kingdom except as provided in the following provisions of
this Part of this Act.” 31 The SIA then goes on to define a “State” to include
at least some individuals, specifically heads of state.32 The SIA expressly
excludes criminal proceedings, 33 also suggesting that individual officials
are covered by the SIA. 34 With respect to the immunity of individuals
under the SIA, Lord Bingham indicated that “[i]t is not suggested that the
Act is in any relevant respect ambiguous or obscure.” 35
Lord Bingham began with the premise that “[t]he foreign state’s right to
immunity cannot be circumvented by suing its servants or agents.” 36 In
other words, he began with a baseline assumption that individual officials
always share the state’s immunity. However, in finding that the instant
suits would indeed “circumvent” Saudi Arabia’s immunity, he imported
language from cases involving claims for damages or injunctive relief that
would run directly against the state into the different context of actions
seeking damages solely from the individual. 37 Contrary to Lord Bingham’s
reading, cases prior to Jones, including the very cases Jones cites, support
the proposition that absolute immunity is not the appropriate answer where
relief would not run directly against the state. 38 Instead, where the state is
not directly impleaded, other prudential doctrines such as the political
question doctrine, exhaustion of local remedies, or forum non conveniens
enable courts to decline to exercise their adjudicatory jurisdiction where
doing so would have undesirable collateral effects.
In Jones, the House of Lords succumbed to the fallacy that adjudicating
conduct that is attributable to a state necessarily impleads that state.39
Having embraced this approach as his starting point, Lord Bingham focused
the bulk of his analysis on whether or not the claimants could overcome the
individual defendants’ statutory immunity under the U.K. SIA by invoking

31. State Immunity Act, 1978, c. 33, § 1(1) (U.K.); see Jones v. Ministry of the Interior
of Saudi Arabia, [2006] UKHL 26, [9] (Lord Bingham of Cornhill) (appeal taken from
Eng.).
32. State Immunity Act § 14(1)(a).
33. Id. § 16(4).
34. In these respects, as Lord Justice Mance observed, the U.S. Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified in scattered sections of
28 U.S.C.), “is in very different wording to the United Kingdom’s State Immunity Act
1978.” Jones, [2004] EWCA (Civ) [63] (Mance L.J.).
35. Jones, [2006] UKHL [13] (Lord Bingham of Cornhill).
36. Id. [10].
37. See id.
38. For a discussion of these cases, see Keitner, Annotated Brief, supra note 1, at 623–
29.
39. Jones, [2006] UKHL [13]. For a contrary argument, see Keitner, The Common Law,
supra note 1, at 69–71.
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Article 6 of the European Convention. 40 He therefore set out to determine
whether the SIA’s restriction on the claimants’ access to an English court
was proportionate and directed to a legitimate objective. 41 On this point,
Lord Bingham did not find the House of Lords’s conclusion in Pinochet
(No. 3) helpful to the claimants, because it “concerned criminal proceedings
falling squarely within the universal criminal jurisdiction mandated by the
Torture Convention and did not fall within Part 1 of the 1978 Act.” 42 (He
might also have added that Pinochet was not entitled to immunity under the
SIA, because the SIA excludes criminal proceedings.) 43 Because he began
from a presumption of individual immunity, Lord Bingham examined
Pinochet and other cases 44 from the perspective of the search for an
exception to immunity. 45 However, the four arguments that persuaded him
to start from this baseline are deeply problematic:
(1) Lord Bingham emphasized that the Arrest Warrant 46
decision of the International Court of Justice found that an
allegation of a jus cogens violation does not override the statusbased immunity of a sitting foreign minister.47 However, he
neglected to emphasize that this decision did not find that lowerlevel officials or former officials are immune from the jurisdiction
of a foreign court;
(2) Lord Bingham noted that Article 14 of the Convention
Against Torture does not mandate universal civil jurisdiction.48
However, even if this is so, it says nothing about conduct-based
immunity where domestic jurisdiction otherwise exists;
(3) Lord Bingham attached weight to the definition of “state” in
the 2004 UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities, which
includes “representatives of the State acting in that capacity.”49
However, the convention is not in force due to the low number of
ratifications, and this definition of “state” is not uniformly reflected
in domestic state immunity acts; and
(4) Lord Bingham observed that there is no overwhelming
international consensus requiring states to exercise universal civil
jurisdiction over serious international law violations.50 However,
40. Jones, [2006] UKHL [14] (Lord Bingham of Cornhill).
41. Id.
42. Id. [19].
43. See State Immunity Act, 1978, c. 33, § 16(4) (U.K.).
44. Jones, [2006] UKHL [20].
45. Id. [27].
46. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, 22 (Feb.
14).
47. Jones, [2006] UKHL [24].
48. Id. [25]. But see Christopher Keith Hall, The Duty of States Parties to the
Convention Against Torture to Provide Procedures Permitting Victims to Recover
Reparations for Torture Committed Abroad, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 921, 923 (2007).
49. Jones, [2006] UKHL [10], [26] (Lord Bingham of Cornhill).
50. See id. [27].
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even if this were true, it does not mean that states are prohibited
from exercising civil jurisdiction within the limits defined by
status-based immunities, other limits on personal and subjectmatter jurisdiction, and applicable abstention doctrines.
Even if Lord Bingham’s conclusion were correct, it would mean only
that “Part 1 of the 1978 Act [conferring immunity on foreign officials] is
not shown to be disproportionate as inconsistent with a peremptory norm of
international law.”51 Although the United Kingdom’s decision to grant
individuals immunity under its SIA does count as state practice for the
purpose of customary international law formation, that decision is not
uniformly reflected in the legislative and judicial choices of other
countries. 52 In addition, at the time of writing, the claimants in Jones and
Mitchell v. United Kingdom had petitioned the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR) to revisit the House of Lords’s conclusion, and briefing to
the ECHR was in progress. 53 How the ECHR approaches the baseline
question will likely determine the outcome of its deliberations, if it decides
to issue an opinion on the merits. In addition, the questions posed by the
court to the parties indicate that it will only address the question of whether
granting immunity to individual officials, as the U.K. SIA does, is
incompatible with Article 6 of the European Convention. 54 This is different
from the question of whether refusing to grant immunity to individual
officials violates international law.
The United Kingdom’s observations to the ECHR in Jones and Mitchell,
which are accessible to the public on request at the court’s registry, take the
position that “the assertion of jurisdiction by the courts [of one State] over a
foreign State or the officials of a foreign State in civil proceedings in
respect of which the State is entitled to immunity constitutes a violation of
international law by the forum State.”55 By conceptualizing state immunity
as an international law limit on the adjudicative authority of each state,56
51. Id. [28].
52. At the request of the European Court of Human Rights, the Government of the
United Kingdom prepared an appendix on state practice with regard to state immunities,
focusing on whether contracting states “allowed civil proceedings to be brought against
officials of another State and/or compensation to be awarded to victims in criminal
proceedings brought against those officials.” Jones v. United Kingdom, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R.
1427, ¶ 1 app. Responses to a survey conducted by the Government revealed that
as to the specific questions concerning the plea of immunity when there were
allegations of torture, many States commented (not unsurprisingly) that such a case
had not come before their courts, and that accordingly, they could only offer
responses based on the general principles and practices applied by their courts, and
that the responses were hypothetical.
Id. ¶ 11. The relative lack of state practice in this area makes the question of whether one
begins with a baseline of jurisdiction or a baseline of immunity particularly important.
53. Statement of Facts ¶¶ 33–34, Jones, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1427 (App. Nos. 34356/06
& 40528/06).
54. Id. ¶¶ 1–19.
55. Observations of the Government of the United Kingdom on the Admissibility and
Merits of the Applications ¶ I.3, Jones, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1427 (App. Nos. 34356/06 &
40528/06) [hereinafter Observations] (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
56. Id. ¶ II.1.
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the question of immunity collapses into one of attribution.57 Under this
approach, rules attributing individual conduct to the state define the
contours of conduct-based immunity.
This approach has the virtue of simplicity, but it is not grounded in either
state practice or a faithful interpretation of the purposes behind the rules of
state responsibility. The International Law Commission specifically
emphasized, in elaborating principles of state responsibility, that individual
officials cannot “hide behind the State in respect of their own responsibility
for conduct of theirs which is contrary to rules of international law which
are applicable to them.” 58 While the United Kingdom is no doubt correct
that “the general rule is one of immunity” 59 with respect to states
themselves, it is more problematic to assert that state immunity and the
immunity of state officials is always congruent. For example, if this were
the case, state agents would not be immune for commercial activities
performed on behalf of the state—a proposition that is not supported by
state practice, and to which few judges or scholars would likely subscribe.
One could take the position that the scope of state immunity provides a
floor but not a ceiling for claims of official immunity, but to do so would be
to recognize that the two are not necessarily congruent, something that
proponents of the attribution theory of conduct-based immunity resist.
The United Kingdom argues that, because states can only act through
individuals, individuals do not bear civil liability for any acts taken on
behalf of the state. This flows from its position that “[t]he doctrine of
imputability of the acts of the individual to the State imputes the act solely
to the State, who alone is responsible for its consequences.” 60 In the United
Kingdom’s view, this is the only way to ensure that civil suits naming
individuals will not be used to circumvent the immunity of the state.61 In
this perspective, the state is indirectly impleaded in any civil action against
an individual for official conduct because “not only are its acts called into
question, but it would be expected to satisfy any award of damages and, in
all probability, would be the only source from which such an award of
damages could be satisfied.” 62
The United Kingdom’s position in its observations to the ECHR is a
classic statement of the attribution theory. The attribution theory of
conduct-based immunity starts with a baseline of absolute conduct-based
immunity for individual officials, and recognizes exceptions for waiver by
the state, criminal jurisdiction, and territorial torts. The territorial theory,
by contrast, starts with a baseline of plenary jurisdiction by the forum state
over its territory and individuals present in that territory, but recognizes
conduct-based immunity for acts that do not entail personal responsibility.
57. Id. ¶ I.9(i).
58. Draft Articles, supra note 5, at 143.
59. Observations, supra note 55, ¶ II.7.
60. Id. ¶ III.63.
61. See Response of the Government of the United Kingdom to the Applicants’ Reply
Observations and to the Third Parties’ Submissions ¶ 45, Jones v. United Kingdom, 2009
Eur. Ct. H.R. 1427 (App. Nos. 34356/06 & 40528/06).
62. Observations, supra note 55, ¶ III.69; see id. ¶ III.71(iv).
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Torture is not such an act. The more persuasive international law argument
against the exercise of adjudicatory jurisdiction over a defendant who is not
present on the forum state’s territory would be that it constitutes an
unreasonable exercise of jurisdiction, not that such jurisdiction does not
exist because of conduct-based immunity.
II. NEW ZEALAND
While the Jones case was on appeal to the House of Lords, a trial court in
Auckland, New Zealand confronted the question in Fang v Jiang 63 of
whether plaintiffs were entitled to serve proceedings out of the jurisdiction
on Chinese officials allegedly responsible for the plaintiffs’ torture in
China. 64 At the first rehearing, the plaintiffs relied on the English Court of
Appeal’s decision in Jones. 65 The judge reserved his decision pending the
appeal of that decision to the U.K. House of Lords. 66 When the House of
Lords reversed the Court of Appeal, the plaintiffs attempted to distinguish
Jones on the ground that New Zealand has no legislation comparable to the
U.K. SIA. 67 The judge elected to follow Jones. 68
The New Zealand trial judge acknowledged that the plaintiffs in Jones
began with a baseline of immunity, provided in the SIA, and that they
therefore “needed to establish a means of overriding or displacing that
immunity.” 69 Nevertheless, he relied on the House of Lords’s analysis of
whether international law requires overriding statutory immunity to find
that international law requires providing conduct-based immunity to
individuals outside the jurisdiction.70 To be sure, some of the language in
Jones about state immunity discusses it in compulsory terms, but the
procedural posture of that case only required the judges to determine
whether they were compelled to override statutory immunity, not whether
international law required granting immunity. 71 By uncritically adopting
the baseline in Jones, and by relying on Lord Bingham’s misreading of
prior cases, the New Zealand trial judge in Fang embraced the attribution
theory of foreign official immunity even though this was not required by
either New Zealand domestic law or by international law.
The trial court’s opinion in Fang has not been reviewed by the New
Zealand Court of Appeal or the New Zealand Supreme Court. That said, it
reflects the position urged by the New Zealand Attorney-General in the
case, 72 and contributes to state practice regarding conduct-based immunity
63. [2007] NZAR 420 (N.Z.).
64. Id. ¶¶ 1, 4–6.
65. Id. ¶ 40.
66. Id. ¶ 7.
67. Id. ¶ 62.
68. Id. ¶ 63.
69. Id. ¶ 29.
70. See id. ¶ 68.
71. See Jones v. Ministry of the Interior of Saudi Arabia, [2006] UKHL 26, [9], [28]
(Lord Bingham of Cornhill) (appeal taken from Eng.).
72. See Submissions on Behalf of the Attorney-General in Relation to Rule 220
Application, Fang, [2007] NZAR 420 (No. CIV 2004-404-5843) [hereinafter Submissions];
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in those countries that permit service outside the jurisdiction. The
Attorney-General started with the baseline that state immunity and
individual civil immunity are indistinguishable, and therefore that “[o]nly if
a recognised exception applies is immunity displaced.” 73 Even though the
foreign state was “not directly impleaded”74 because China was not a
named defendant, the Attorney-General argued that “to sue an individual
indirectly impleads the state,” 75 and that “[t]o sue an individual for an act
where the state itself has immunity fundamentally undermines the state’s
immunity.” 76 In a submission predating the House of Lords’s opinion in
Jones, the New Zealand Attorney-General faulted the U.K. Court of
Appeal’s finding that “officials had state immunity in relation to all acts
falling short of torture, but not in relation to torture itself” 77 because, under
the Court of Appeal’s reasoning, “it is difficult to see why torture should be
treated differently from other illegal acts.”78 The Attorney-General thus
found the Court of Appeal’s reasoning unpersuasive and urged the New
Zealand trial court to reject it.
The Attorney-General acknowledged that the “starting point” in civil
cases is usually that “as a general proposition, the New Zealand Courts have
jurisdiction over parties who may be served within New Zealand.”79 The
Attorney-General also observed that criminal proceedings for torture, which
would not be barred by immunity, “usually depend on the physical presence
of the alleged torturer in the jurisdiction.” 80 One might think that these
observations support the territorial theory, rather than the attribution theory.
To the contrary, however, the Attorney-General relied on the House of
Lords’s opinion in Jones to argue that “[individual] immunity from civil
liability parallels the responsibility of states at international law.”81
According to this view, criminal proceedings against individuals do not
indirectly implead the state because states cannot bear criminal
responsibility. 82
The Attorney-General regarded the House of Lords’s opinion in Jones as
“an authoritative assessment of state immunity under current international
law.” 83 However, as I have argued elsewhere, 84 insofar as Jones misreads
prior cases on the scope of foreign official immunity, it should not be
regarded as an authoritative statement of international law (as opposed to

Further Submissions on Behalf of the Attorney-General, Fang, [2007] NZAR 420 (No. CIV
2004-404-5843) [hereinafter Further Submissions].
73. Submissions, supra note 72, ¶ 20.
74. Id. ¶ 66.
75. Id. ¶ 79.
76. Id.
77. Id. ¶ 85.
78. Id. ¶ 86.
79. Id. ¶ 107.
80. Id. ¶ 91.
81. Further Submissions, supra note 72, ¶ 4.3.
82. Id. ¶ 5.1.
83. Id. ¶ 7.1.
84. See Keitner, Annotated Brief, supra note 1, at 623–29.
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U.K. domestic law). 85 The state practice relied upon by Jones relates to the
immunity of states themselves. It is only by making the further assumption
that individual immunity must always be commensurate with state
immunity, and then excepting both criminal immunity (which is less) and
civil immunity for commercial transactions (which is greater) from this
blanket rule, that the Jones opinion, and those that have followed it, can
conclude that individual officials always share the civil immunity of the
state.
III. AUSTRALIA
Foreign official immunity in Australia is governed by the Foreign States
Immunities Act of 1985. This statute contains a number of provisions that
indicate its applicability to individual officials, and that explicitly confer
responsibility for certifying the official status of a particular individual or
entity at the time of the alleged conduct on the Minister for Foreign
Affairs. 86 An additional feature of this statutory scheme is that service of
process must be effectuated on individual foreign defendants through
diplomatic channels.87 In finding individual Chinese officials immune from
jurisdiction in Zhang v Zemin, the Court of Appeal of New South Wales
relied on the finding of the commission that drafted the Immunities Act that
“[w]ith respect to individuals, once it is shown that a person acted ‘for the
purposes of the foreign State itself’ rather than [in] a personal capacity,
immunity can be claimed.” 88
As suggested above, the proposition that certain conduct by officials on
behalf of a state benefits from state immunity is unremarkable; the fallacy
lies in assuming that all such conduct benefits from state immunity. This
was also the problem in Jones, which takes language from cases in which
the state was effectively the real party in interest and generalizes this to
contexts in which the individual official bears concurrent responsibility for
his or her conduct. Indeed, the New South Wales Court of Appeal cites
familiar statements about the inability to circumvent state immunity by
suing the state’s agents, and observes that “[n]umerous similar quotations
could be gathered.” 89 While this is no doubt true, reading such quotations
out of their context creates a false impression about the extent of individual

85. The Attorney-General indicated that the House of Lords “follow[ed] caselaw in the
United Kingdom, Germany, the United States, Canada, Ireland and in the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the recently concluded Convention on
Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property.” Further Submissions, supra note 72,
¶ 4.3. My reading of the same cases indicates that Jones went well beyond the proposition
that those cases represent on the question of foreign official immunity, as opposed to foreign
state immunity. Of course, since Jones explicitly conflates the two types of immunity and
insists that they must be congruent, this is not surprising.
86. See Zhang v Zemin [2010] NSWCA 255, ¶ 11 (Austl.) (special leave to appeal
refused on May 11, 2011).
87. Id. ¶ 58.
88. Id. ¶ 68.
89. Id. ¶ 77.
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official immunity that has in fact been recognized outside the provisions of
a particular domestic statute.
In the Australian case, the domestic statute was determinative. The Court
of Appeal found that the Act does “not allow for any exception based upon
international law, even if that law is of the character for which the appellant
contends.” 90 Judge Allsop emphasized in his concurring remarks:
To find that the perpetrators of such acts [such as torture] in an official or
public capacity are able to be rendered liable under the civil law of a State
for the consequences of their acts one must have recourse to the relevant
law of that State governing foreign state immunity. In Australia, that is
the [Immunities] Act. 91

Consequently, “[i]f the Commonwealth Parliament wishes to remove the
immunity of foreign States for civil liability for torture such as by
legislating in accordance with Article 14 of the Torture Convention, it must
amend the Act.” 92 In sum, Australian jurisprudence on foreign official
immunity involves the proper interpretation and application of its domestic
statute, which contains a baseline of immunity and a series of exceptions
that the courts have treated as exhaustive. Absent a domestic statute that
requires immunity for individual foreign officials, such a baseline is not the
appropriate starting point for an inquiry into conduct-based immunity.
IV. CANADA
As in the United Kingdom and Australia, foreign official immunity and
any exceptions to immunity are governed in Canada by a State Immunity
Act 93 (Canada SIA). An Ontario Court of Appeal opinion in 2004 found
that there was no exception to the immunity of the state itself for allegations
of torture, because no such exception was contained in the Canada SIA. 94
In Kazemi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 95 a Québec trial court recently
reached the same conclusion, in a decision that was under appeal at the time
of writing. The Québec judge emphasized:
[T]he SIA contains all of the legal rules and principles which may be
invoked to decide whether immunity should, or not, be granted to a
foreign state. The SIA is a complete statute which suffers no intrusion
from the common law, international law or Canada’s international treaty
obligations. 96

The opinion then drew a sharp distinction between the two claimants in the
case: the first, the estate of the deceased photojournalist who was allegedly
tortured and killed in Iran, and the second, her son, who suffered the loss of

90. Id. ¶ 130.
91. Id. ¶ 170 (Allsop, J.).
92. Id. ¶ 172.
93. R.S.C. 1985, c. S-18 (Can.).
94. Bouzari v. Islamic Republic of Iran (2004), 71 O.R. 3d 675 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
95. Kazemi v. Islamic Republic of Iran (Jan. 25, 2011), No. 500-17-031760-062 (Can.
Ont. Sup. Ct.).
96. Id. ¶ 51.
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his relationship with his mother and continues to endure psychological and
emotional harm in Canada as a result of this loss.97
The court found this distinction significant because Section 6 of the
Canada SIA indicates that a state is not immune from the jurisdiction of the
court in any proceedings that relate to any personal or bodily injury or
property damage that occurs in Canada. 98 Much of the opinion therefore
focused on the scope of the definition of “personal or bodily injury”
(dommage corporel or préjudice corporel in the equally authoritative
French text) in light of relevant Canadian Supreme Court precedent and
treatises to determine whether it would encompass the son’s suffering.99
The court found that, particularly at this early stage of the proceedings, the
son’s allegation of psychological trauma was sufficient to constitute
préjudice corporel because it was more than merely distress: it was “an
attack upon the physical integrity of the person enduring it.”100 As a result,
section 6 operated to remove the immunity both of the state and of the
individual defendants, providing that the son could properly demonstrate
the extent of his suffering at trial.101
The court also considered the argument that individual foreign officials
(not including the head of state) should be deemed to fall outside the scope
of the Canada SIA altogether. It rejected this contention, holding that “the
codification of state immunity in Canada cannot have any other purpose
than to immunize official individuals from the jurisdiction of Canadian
courts, while acting in their official capacity.” 102 Moreover, unlike the
territorial tort exception, “in the exceptions enumerated in the SIA there is
no exception concerning the illegality of the acts of the foreign state or its
agents.” 103 Relying exclusively on the provisions of the Canada SIA, the
court reached the conclusion that both individual and state immunity could
be overcome by the breach of the son’s physical integrity on Canadian soil
through a principle of effects jurisdiction, but that the mother’s estate could
not surmount the immunity barrier. 104 At the time of writing, both parties
had challenged the court’s conclusions. 105
V. THE UNITED STATES
Unlike the U.K., Australian, and Canadian state immunity acts, the U.S.
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 106 does not govern the immunity of
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. ¶¶ 52–53.
Id. ¶ 55.
Id. ¶ 63.
Id. ¶¶ 78–79.
Id. ¶ 92.
Id. ¶ 138.
Id. ¶ 152.
Id. ¶¶ 92–93, 153.
See Public CCIJ Cases Zahra Kazemi, CANADIAN CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL
JUSTICE, http://www.ccij.ca/programs/cases/index.php?WEBYEP_DI=10 (last visited Oct.
20, 2011).
106. Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1976) (codified in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C.).
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individual foreign officials.107 The decisions in Jones, Zhang, and Kazemi
are thus less instructive on the scope of individual conduct-based immunity
in the U.S. context, just as those courts have distinguished their approach
from that of the United States. 108 Because personal jurisdiction in U.S.
cases is generally established on the basis of the defendant’s territorial
presence (even if that presence is transitory),109 the territorial theory of
immunity might justifiably play a greater role in U.S. cases than it has in
countries that more readily authorize service outside the jurisdiction.
Moreover, because the countries examined above, with the exception of
New Zealand, have found individual immunity under state immunity acts
that explicitly exempt criminal proceedings, those countries have been able
to uphold civil immunity while denying criminal immunity. Any theory of
immunity from the civil jurisdiction of U.S. courts will have to explain why
criminal cases are different as a doctrinal—as opposed to just a policy—
matter.
If one begins from a baseline of plenary territorial jurisdiction rather than
absolute state immunity, the burden shifts to the defendant to show why
immunity is required by either domestic or international law. Under a
faithful reading of the common law precedents cited in Jones, such
immunity may be required when the state is the real party in interest or a
necessary party. There might be other barriers to adjudication, such as a
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, forum non conveniens, the prudential act
of state doctrine, a prudential requirement of exhaustion of remedies, and so
forth. But the work these various doctrines do should not all be lumped
together under the rubric of immunity, thus unilaterally depriving U.S.
courts of the ability to adjudicate conduct that otherwise falls within their
jurisdiction.
The baseline issue is not unique to the question of foreign official
immunity. As Dame Rosalyn Higgins wrote in 1982 with regard to the
restrictive theory of foreign state immunity:
It is very easy to elevate sovereign immunity into a superior principle of
international law and to lose sight of the essential reality that it is an
exception to the normal doctrine of jurisdiction. It is a derogation from
the normal rule of territorial sovereignty. It is sovereign immunity which
is the exception to jurisdiction and not jurisdiction which is the exception
to a basic rule of immunity. An exception to the normal rules of
jurisdiction should only be granted when international law requires—that
is to say, when it is consonant with justice and with the equitable
protection of the parties. It is not to be granted “as of right.” 110

107. Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2292 (2010).
108. See, e.g., Zhang v Zemin [2010] NSWCA 255, ¶ 78 (Austl.) (“[T]he constitutional
and legislative position is so different in Australia [from the United States], that I do not find
that decision [in Samantar] of significant assistance for the purposes of interpreting the
Australian legislation.”).
109. See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878); see also Burnham v. Superior Court,
495 U.S. 604 (1990).
110. Higgins, supra note 4, at 271. My thanks to Beth Stephens for drawing my attention
to this passage.
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The baseline issue is significant because, as Dame Higgins indicated,
“[I]n any marginal case issues about the burden of proof will arise.”111
Given the arguably unsettled nature of the international law of foreign
official immunity, the result of looking to international law in a given case
will depend on whether one seeks to prove a settled exception to a baseline
of plenary jurisdiction, or a settled exception to a baseline of absolute
immunity. 112
My central point in this Essay is not to lose sight of the role of territory,
or what I have elsewhere referred to as “presence.” 113 Because immunity is
an exception to jurisdiction, a court’s first task is to determine whether
personal and subject matter jurisdiction exist with regard to the defendant
and the substance of the claim, respectively. In the U.S. context, the
physical presence of the defendant on the forum state’s territory, and any
other jurisdictional links, can and should affect the baseline from which a
U.S. court reasons about that defendant’s entitlement to immunity from
either civil or criminal jurisdiction. If the defendant is entitled to statusbased immunity, this will preclude a U.S. court from exercising both civil
and criminal jurisdiction. If the defendant is entitled to conduct-based
immunity because the challenged act entails only state responsibility, then a
court should find immunity. But there are an increasing number of acts that
entail both state and individual responsibility. For these acts, the attribution
theory of immunity provides an incomplete and potentially misleading
answer unless it is dictated by a specific, authoritative domestic statute.
The territorial theory better accommodates the competing principle of the
forum state’s plenary jurisdiction over its own territory and should serve as
the starting point for discussions of common law immunity—and potential
revisions to other countries’ state immunity acts—going forward.

111. Id.
112. On the unsettled nature of international law, see Bradley & Helfer, supra note 6, at
248 (indicating that customary international law in the area of foreign official immunity “is
unsettled and rapidly evolving”); Stephens, supra note 7, at 2687 (“[T]here are no binding,
comprehensive international treaties or customary international law norms governing the
immunity of foreign officials.”).
113. See Keitner, Foreign Official Immunity, supra note 1.

